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Realistic Reasoning and the Unreal World:
Gauḍapāda’s Use of Nyāya Methodology to 
Argue for Illusionism
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ABSTRACT: The ancient Indian philosopher/theologian Gauḍapāda (probably fifth 
century ce) is credited with having founded the school of Advaita Vedānta. He 
unfolds his doctrines in four separate but related treatises which tradition has al-
ways transmitted under the title Gauḍapādīya-kārikā. Gauḍapāda’s treatises evince 
a persistent tendency towards illusionism; he uses logic to argue for the unreality 
of the perceivable world. Especially in book 4, he develops his argument that the 
world was never created, that therefore it is an illusion or magic, māyā, and that 
it is only our perceiving consciousness. What is most baffling is the fact that in 
order to develop his arguments against the reality of the world, he uses the logical 
terminology and methodology of the early Nyāya, a school whose outlook on the 
world is realistic and thus the exact opposite of the outlook Gauḍapāda is espous-
ing. This article will try to discuss and resolve the seeming contradiction between 
Gauḍapāda’s illusionism and the realism of early Nyāya.
KEYWORDS: consciousness; early Advaita; early Nyāya; illusionism; realism; rea-
soning.
VEDāNTIC IllUSIONISM AND NYāYA REAlISM
The high intellectual and religious prestige of the Vedāntic school of non-
duality, Advaita, is usually considered to have been the outcome of Śaṅkara’s 
writings and his efforts to establish Advaita monasteries in the four cor-
ners of India. However, Śaṅkara did not work in a vacuum and was not the 
1. Victor van Bijlert is lecturer in Indian religions and Sanskrit at the Faculty of Theology, 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. His research interests cover Indian philosophy, history, 
modern Hinduism and Bengali literature. His latest book is a collection of Dutch transla-
tions of the Gauḍapādīya-kārikā, the Prajñāpāramitā-hṛdaya and the Vajracchedikā, Bewustzijn 
boven taal en dualiteit (Consciousness beyond language and duality) (Amsterdam: VU Uni-
versity Press, 2016).
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inventor of Advaita. He inherited Advaita from predecessors, most impor-
tant among whom was Gauḍapāda, who lived probably in the fifth century 
ce.2 Non-duality as a philosophical doctrine, and a hermeneutical principle 
to interpret the major doctrines of the Upaniṣads, derives from the latter’s 
four essays, collectively known as Gauḍapādīya-kārikā (GK). The earliest ref-
erences to Gauḍapāda’s texts can be found in ādiśeṣa’s Paramārthasāra (the 
essence of supreme truth) (PS). This author dates from the early sixth century 
ce (Danielson 1980: 1-2).3 Gauḍa pāda’s writings present us with a seemingly 
glaring contradiction. The unreality of the visible world is argued with the 
help of an epistemology and logic that assume the reality of the world. How 
to resolve this contradiction? In what follows we will try to give an account 
of what Gauḍapāda is attempting to argue and how he used the epistemology 
and logic of the early Nyāya-school to make his points. As far as I am aware, 
no one has yet discussed this issue in detail.4
One of the important doctrinal elements of Advaita Vedānta theology-
soteriology is the idea of the world as illusion, as something that has no per-
manence, as something that is in reality not what it seems, the world as a 
magic show, as māyā.5 The Sanskrit term māyā has various shades of mean-
ing, but they all circle around the idea of trickery, jugglery, witchcraft, magic, 
unreality, deceit, apparition, ephemerality.6 this māyā contrasts with what is 
2. For a discussion of the dates of Gauḍapāda see Bijlert (1983: 99–100, 2016: 146–47). Richard 
King mentions as date around sixth century (King 1999: 54, 1999a: 137). Christopher Bart-
ley (2015: 182) dates Gauḍapāda to 450–500 ce. In any case, Gauḍapāda preceded Śaṅkara 
by several centuries. In his French edition of Gauḍapāda’s texts, Christian Bouy (2000: 21, 
29-31) proposes a wider range: between 550 and 700 ce. Bouy bases this among others on 
his belief that Gauḍapāda refers to the Nyāya Vārttika and the Paramārthasāra of ādiśeṣa, 
texts which most scholars would date post-Gauḍapāda. Richard Jones (2014: 38) also dates 
Gauḍapāda in the sixth or seventh century ce.
3. Allusions to GK abound in the Paramārthasāra: PS 22, 50 talking about the rope mistaken 
for a snake alludes to GK 2.17-18; PS 25 about the Self being awakened and pure alludes to 
GK 4.98, the same PS verse also talks about being illumined once and for all and alludes to 
GK 4.81 and 3.36-37; PS 30 refers to the list of things falsely associations with the Self, a list 
found in full in GK 2.19; PS 31 talks about turya, the fourth part of the Self, and seems to 
allude to GK 1.10-15 as well as Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad; PS 24, 35–36, 51 refer to the space meta-
phor deriving from GK 3.3-8.
4. Already Bouy (2000: 219) referred to Gauḍapāda’s use of Nyāya terminology. Bouy also 
noticed that the simile of the glowing chip of wood in Gauḍapāda’s book 4 is also found in 
the NS (p. 255).
5. This does not mean all Advaita authors always attached the same meaning to the concept 
of māyā, nor that the same author is always consistent in his appreciation of the concept. 
6. Cf. the famous verse from Vajracchedikā 32: tārakā timiraṃ dīpo māyāvaśyāya budbudaḥ / 
supinaṃ vidyud abhraṃ ca evaṃ draṣṭavya saṃskṛtaṃ / / (Schopen 1989: 107); ‘A shooting 
star, a fault of vision, a lamp; An illusion (māyā) and dew and a bubble; A dream, a flash of 
lightning, a thunder cloud—In this way is the conditioned to be seen’ (p. 131). The term 
‘illusion’ is used here in a series of similes expressing the ephemerality of everything that 
is ‘conditioned’ (saṃskṛtaṃ) or ‘produced from cooperating causes’. The Vajracchedikā is a 
well-known Mahāyāna sūtra predating Gauḍapāda.
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not deceitful, not an apparition, not a magic show, something that lasts for-
ever. Most versions of mainstream Advaita Vedānta doctrine hold that the 
world as it seems to us is a magic show but in reality the world is no other 
than Brahman, the original ground of the universe. Thus, the world as world 
is māyā; as Brahman the world is real, unchanging and eternal. In the remain-
der of this article I am using the term ‘illusion’ to designate the worldly aspect 
of the world, the world as it seems. 
We can interpret this Vedāntic illusionism against the backdrop of the 
ancient Indian institution of world-renunciation. Many schools of Indian 
thought that are designated as philosophy could equally well be called the-
ology with a strong emphasis on soteriology; this observation is valid also 
for Buddhism. These schools of thought were developed by world-renouncers 
and addressed the psychology of world-renunciation. That the world is a 
magic show and that only Brahman is real, would make good sense to a world-
renouncer following Advaita Vedānta as his soteriology. After all, he or she is 
enjoined to regard the social world with its many castes and its four socio-
religious classes as an illusion, as a magic show. The reality is the world as 
Brahman, and that is what the Vedāntic renouncer was supposed to realize. 
Ignoring this sociological and soteriological context can cause serious mis-
interpretations of Vedāntic illusionism. For a good example of a modern cri-
tique of Vedāntic monism and illusionism based on such misinterpretation, 
see Jones (2014: 63-76). Jones criticizes Gauḍapāda’s illusionism—quite aptly 
and rationally—as if Gauḍapāda were a philosopher with modern philosophi-
cal concerns. I think the point with Gauḍapāda’s thought in all four tracts is 
that they are not trying to explain the visible world in the sense of natural 
science. Gauḍapāda’s main concern is soteriological, and his doctrines seem 
to be means towards a liberating goal, not explanatory ends in themselves.
For an early and argued case for Advaita illusionism, Gauḍapāda seems to 
be an important source, and perhaps the very first. His reasoning on the illu-
sory character of the world has remained classic, and was referred to a few 
centuries after him by Śaṅkara. The latter’s writings have, of course, set the 
standards for all subsequent Advaita philosophy / theology. But in order to 
get to the earliest known pre-Śaṅkara version of illusionism based on logical 
arguments and reasoning, we should turn to Gauḍapāda.
Before we analyse Gauḍapāda’s line of argument, we must devote some 
attention to the issue of the order of his texts. The GK consists of four texts 
that are loosely connected by the same themes but are not four chapters 
of a single work. The traditional order (1, 2, 3, 4, preserved among others 
in the commentary of Śaṅkara) is based on increasing length: book 1 is the 
shortest, book 4 the longest. But this is very likely not the order in which 
Gauḍapāda wrote them. It has long been maintained that book 4 was the earli-
est (Vetter 1978: 106-107). This seems the most likely position to take.7 Besides 
7. Bouy (2000: 41-43) believes the order of the four texts is the order in which they are pre-
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the arguments mentioned by Vetter, only book 4 has a formal introductory 
verse of praise, while the other three have no such verse. Books 2 and 3 are 
independent treatises which could be understood to be appendices to, and 
partial retractions of, what was presented in book 4. Book 1 is a running dis-
cussion of the content of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, a very short Upaniṣad that 
presents a fourfold model of consciousness. The four parts of consciousness 
make up the supreme Self as taught in the older Upaniṣads. 
Book 4 argues about reaching a transcendent state of non-dual conscious-
ness, a consciousness that is at the same time the basis of our everyday expe-
rience. The fourth book is predominantly Buddhist in terminology and intent; 
the other three elaborate and modulate on the same themes as book 4, but not 
in Buddhist terms. The other three texts constantly refer to the Upaniṣads 
and seem to argue the case of book 4 in terms not of Mahāyāna Buddhist ide-
alism but of the Upaniṣads, so that they teach what looks like a Brahmanized 
version of the same Buddhist idealism. In any case, only book 4 offers a doc-
trine of illusionism that is based on reasoning, not on mere assertion.
Hidden within Gauḍapāda’s argued illusionism we can detect a conspicu-
ous paradox. Gauḍapāda reasons against the reality of the everyday world 
and on these grounds for pure idealism (the world is nothing but our own 
consciousness). He accomplishes this with the help of logic and an epistemol-
ogy that look like the very opposite of illusionism. For his epistemological 
and logical apparatus in book 4, Gauḍapāda relies heavily on the Nyāyasūtra 
of Akṣapāda Gotama (NS).8 In some cases Gauḍapāda also refers to the earliest 
commentary on the NS, Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyabhāṣya (NB) (proba-
bly late fourth century (King 1999: 60; Bartley 2015: 309)). Now the early Nyāya 
system as promoted by the NS is a philosophy that assumes the reality of the 
world.9 Moreover, its system of thought has a soteriological goal, as is stated 
in the first sūtra: pramāṇa … tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ, ‘One obtains 
served in Śaṅkara’s commentary. The four texts, in Bouy’s estimation, are four chapters of 
a single work by a single author. This can only be upheld if we totally ignore the Buddhist 
tone of book 4 and the fact that the other texts make better sense when read as sequels to 
book 4.
8. Probably from around the second century ce (Angot 2009: 15; Bartley 2015: 309; King 1999: 
59–60). But Angot (pp. 15–18) thinks the NS and NB may be regarded as a single text that 
could have been composed between the second and the fifth centuries ce. I am not discuss-
ing here the issues in connection with single or multiple authorship of the NS, or whether 
the text was composed over a number of centuries and contains interpolations with polem-
ics against Buddhist philosophers like Nāgārjuna. I owe the reference to Angot’s French 
translation of the NS and NB to Dr Jan Westerhoff, University of Oxford.
9. For instance, NS 2.1.12-16, refuting a thesis to the effect that the means of valid cogni-
tion do not perceive the past, the present and the future; the refutation is based on the 
claim that denying the existence of a means of valid cognition in past, present and future 
amounts to self-defeat. After all, the denial itself is supposed to be treated as a real means 
of valid cognition. The NB maintains that the means of valid cognition do perceive real 
objects because valid knowledge assists in the performance of useful actions (cf. NB 1: 6-7).
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the supreme good through the correct understanding of: (1) means of valid 
cognition … etc’ (NS 1.1.1). The soteriological goal is further specified in NS 
1.1.2: duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānām uttarottarāpāye tadanantarāpāyād 
apavargaḥ, ‘Final liberation [from continuous rebirth] is effected by the disap-
pearance of false cognition, moral flaws, worldly activity, birth, and suffering. 
In this order one should make them disappear one after the other.’
the NS validates its doctrinal assertions (and thus its soteriology) as much 
as possible on verifiable cognition of the world. The NB clarifies this pro-
cedure, maintaining that the Nyāya as a system of philosophy consists in 
pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇam, ‘the examination of objects [of cognition] with [the 
help of] means of valid cognition’. This examination is pratyakṣāgamāśritaṁ 
… anumānam, ‘inference based on perception and [reliable] tradition’ (NB 
3:11-12). Among the main tools of the NS and NB are epistemology and method-
ical reasoning in which the elements of the Nyāya syllogism often play a role. 
The things that the Nyāya takes up for investigation and that are the objects 
(prameya) worth investigating with the means of valid cognition are: self 
(ātman), body (śarīra), senses (indriya), objects [of the senses] (artha), cogni-
tion (buddhi), mind (manas), worldly activity (pravṛtti), moral flaws (doṣa), the 
hereafter (pretyabhāva), fruits [of action] (phala) suffering (duḥkha) and libera-
tion [from continuous rebirth] (apavarga) (NS 1.1.9). This list is not unique for 
the Nyāya, but the procedure to investigate all of them in methodical debates 
in which means of valid cognition play an important part and in which there 
is always a proponent and an opponent, seems to have been first introduced 
by the Nyāya, and has been followed later by all other schools of thought. 
The reason that the Nyāya influence in Gauḍapāda is little discussed, is 
probably the seeming incompatibility of both systems of thought: realistic 
Nyāya and illusionistic monism. The difference between realism and illu-
sionism is the following: in Gauḍapāda’s doctrine the world as it appears is a 
magic show, and it is nothing but our consciousness; in the Nyāya doctrine the 
objects that we perceive with the senses and the mind exist independently of 
our consciousness. In the realist view we perceive real things; in the illusion-
ist view of Gauḍapāda we perceive a magic show of images, and this takes 
places only within our consciousness. In fact, everything is but our own con-
sciousness. Hence the outside world may not exist, nor the things we imagine 
we perceive outside of ourselves. In what follows I will show that Gauḍapāda 
the illusionist reasoned like a Nyāya realist, and how this made sense. My 
methodology for interpreting and making sense of Gauḍapāda is mainly phil-
ological, in combination with philosophical and historical approaches.
EVERYTHING IS CONSCIOUSNESS
let us first look at what Gauḍapāda is trying to argue in book 4. Its traditional 
title is alātaśānti, ‘extinguishing the glowing chip of wood’. Of his four texts 
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it is the only one explicitly referring to the Buddha.10 Book 4, like the other 
three texts, has a soteriological goal:
jñānenākāśakalpena dharmān yo gaganopamān /
jñeyābhinnena sambuddhas taṁ vande dvipadāṁ varam //1//
asparśayogo vai nāma sarvasattvasukho hitaḥ /
avivādo ’viruddhaś ca deśitas taṁ namāmy aham //2//
I praise that best of men whose knowledge is [endless] like space. This knowledge 
is not different from its object. Through this knowledge this [best of men] has 
reached the awakening to the fact that [all] things11 are [qualitatively] like the fir-
mament [i.e. endless like space].12
Truly this ‘state of no-touch’ (asparśayoga) gives joy to all living beings; it ben-
efits [them]; there is no [philosophical] debate about it; it is not contradicted by 
anything. I bow to him who has given instruction about this [state of no-touch].
(GK 4.1–2)
These two verses praise the human being who has realized a state of con-
sciousness in which subject and object are no different. This state of con-
sciousness is compared to the infinity of space, an association which can be 
found already in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, one of the earliest Mahāyāna 
Sūtras.13 Furthermore, this state of consciousness is named ‘state of no-touch’, 
a rather mysterious term which seems to be unique for Gauḍapāda. No sat-
isfactory identification with other schools has been found until now. So, for 
10. That Buddha is meant is quite explicit in 4.80, 82-85, 98-99. Moreover, in 4.90 Gauḍapāda 
refers to the Mahāyāna ‘great vehicle’ with the less common term agrayāṇa, ‘foremost vehi-
cle’, a term also found in Vajracchedikā 15b.
11. The Sanskrit has dharma in the plural. This is typically Buddhist terminology to denote 
‘things’. Throughout book 4 Gauḍapāda uses this Buddhist term.
12. In the translations I add passages between square brackets. What is between square brack-
ets does not form part of the original text but is in my opinion needed to make for intel-
ligible reading. The style of writing of Gauḍapāda, as indeed of many of his earlier and 
contemporary fellow philosophers, is extremely terse and lapidary. The written words in 
a verse or an aphorism are often no more than a few textual pegs on which hangs a lot of 
unwritten argumentation that one needs to mentally add in order to make sense of the 
statement. Indian philosophers from this period writing foundational texts often did so in 
‘sūtra’ style (like the NS or the Brahma Sūtra etc.), a style known for extreme condensation 
and economy of words. Modern interpreters of these texts often need commentaries in 
order to reconstruct an argument. In the case of Gauḍapāda, we must look primarily at the 
texts preceding him. The first known commentary on Gauḍapāda’s texts is by Śaṅkara who 
wrote a few centuries after Gauḍapāda.
13. Aṣṭasāhasrikā (Vaidya 1960): yathā ākāśe aprameyāṇām asaṃkhyeyānāṃ sattvānām avakāśaḥ 
(12.16-17) ‘as space gives room to immeasurable, innumerable [numbers] of living beings’; 
subhūtir āha—gambhīrā bhagavan prajñāpāramitā / bhagavān āha—ākāśagambhīratayā subhūte 
gambhīrā prajñāpāramitā (96: 12-13) ‘Subhuti said: “lord, the perfection of wisdom is inscru-
table”. The lord answered: “Subhuti, the perfection of wisdom is inscrutable like space 
is inscrutable”’; yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti ākāśāprameyākṣayatayā cittāprameyākṣayateti (127: 
18–19) ‘he clearly knows according to reality that consciousness is immeasurable and unde-
caying like space is immeasurable and undecaying’; ākāśāprameyatayā sarvajñatāprameyatā 
(151: 13) ‘the immeasurableness of all-knowingness is like the immeasurableness of space’.
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the time being, we must assume that Gauḍapāda introduced this term him-
self and assumed it to be self-explanatory. Gauḍapāda uses it once more in GK 
3.39.14 This state of consciousness is a joy for all living beings, so evidently it 
designates a desirable goal for everybody. This state is beyond language and 
debate. Therefore no-one need contradict or oppose it. Once more Gauḍapāda 
hails the teacher who has instructed mankind in reaching this state, obvious-
ly because the instructor has himself realized it first. The remainder of book 4 
elaborates on this state of consciousness and on how to reach it. The very last 
verse summarizes the main qualities of this state and suggests we all should 
strive to attain it:
durdarśam atigambhīram ajaṁ sāmyaṁ viśāradam /
buddhvā padam anānātvaṁ namaskurmo yathābalam / /100 / /
When we have reached [for ourselves] the awakening to this [state of] equality 
[of all things], [a state] difficult to perceive, very profound, unborn and full of 
self-confidence, then according to our ability we bow in reverence to this state in 
which there is no separateness (nānātva).
(GK 4.100)
This is, of course, Gauḍapāda’s last statement in book 4. He also sums up some 
important characteristics of this state, characteristics which he has discussed 
in the preceding 97 verses. The first of these characteristics is ‘unborn-ness’. 
This means the idea that neither this supreme state of consciousness is the 
effect of something, nor is its object, namely all things, an effect. Subject and 
object are thus in fact the same. For at the outset Gauḍapāda had already 
announced that this state of consciousness or knowledge is not different from 
its object. So in order to make plausible the existence of an unborn state of 
consciousness, Gauḍapāda needs to prove that all things are unborn.
RejectIoN of cAUSAlIty
What exactly does Gauḍapāda argue when he is trying to prove that all things 
are unborn? Gauḍapāda is not interested in elaborately analysing perceptible 
everyday reality. He is not trying to account for the infinite variety of facts as 
they present themselves variously to our perceiving consciousness and how 
they might have come about individually from which particular causes. Then 
what remains is: how does consciousness perceive and interpret the totality 
of being? And where did this totality come from?
14. For some discussion on the term, see Bhattacharya (1989: 94–100), King (1995, ch. 5). Rich-
ard King (p. 142) cannot explain it other than: ‘a form of meditative practice culminating 
in the realization of a state of non-contact’. And ‘the most plausible explanation … is that 
it refers both to a form of meditative practice (yoga) and to the goal … that the mind does 
not touch an external object’ (p. 181). Bouy (2000: 182) simply mentions that the term is of 
obscure origin and did not occur in pre-Gauḍapāda texts.
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Gauḍapāda does not reason about causality for individual objects, but he 
argues about causality of everything as a whole. He uses several terms in book 
4 to designate the totality of being: bhūta (being, 4.3-4, 4.38), sarve dharmāḥ 
(all things, 4.10, 4.33, 4.60, 4.91-93, 4.98-99), sarva (everything, 4.36, 4.38, 4.77), 
prakṛti (nature, 4.7, 4.9, 4.29). His basic thesis is that being doesn’t arise from 
anything else. From what could being arise? Either from being, but then being 
already exists, or from non-being, but non-being is nothing and cannot be the 
cause of anything: bhūtaṁ na jāyate kiñcid abhūtaṁ naiva jāyate / ‘Whatever 
exists is not born, whatever does not exist is also not born’ (4.3ab). Reading 
this line carefully, we may notice that ‘whatever exists’ (kiñcid bhūtaṁ), could 
also mean ‘whatever [particular thing] has come about / exists’. This inter-
pretation hinges to some extent on the weight one gives to the quantifier 
‘whatever’ (kiñcid). If the quantifier is given much importance, the statement 
can be interpreted to mean that whatever particular thing exists now or at 
whatever time, does not come about, is not born. Equally baffling would be 
the second statement to the effect that whatever thing does not exist at this 
moment, cannot come about either. But from the sequel of Gauḍapāda’s text 
and from the fact that he uses terms like sarve dharmāḥ (all things), bhūta and 
sarva (everything) interchangeably and synonymously, one is led to believe 
that all three terms designate that totality of all that exists. Thus, we could 
also translate the half śloka 4.3ab as follows: ‘Being is not born, non-being is 
also not born’. That this is the more likely interpretation is further substanti-
ated by the verse that seems to define this totality of being:
sāṃsiddhikī svābhāvikī sahajā akṛtā ca yā /
prakṛtiḥ seti vijñeyā svabhāvaṁ na jahāti yā //9 //
jarāmaraṇanirmuktāḥ sarve dharmāḥ svabhāvataḥ / 10ab
One has to fully realize [the] nature (prakṛti) [of things] which is such that it is 
perfect, it is in possession of its own being, it is original, it is uncreated; and this 
[nature] never abandons its own being.
On the basis of [their] own being, all things (sarve dharmāḥ) are free from old 
age and death.
(GK 4.9–10b)
Gauḍapāda first asserts in 4.3 the principle that out of nothing nothing can 
come forth. Thus whatever is, must necessarily have always existed in essence. 
Whatever exists without a causal beginning is temporally eternal and thus 
does not perish either. For whatever is without beginning is also without end. 
The implied argument here is that what exists has not come about out of noth-
ingness, but always already existed. Prior to its beginning a thing is not, and 
after a thing has perished, it also is not. If a thing did not begin because it did 
not arise out of nothing, neither will it disappear into nothing. But nothing 
remains nothing and whatever exists, or all things, have never come about but 
existed always. This reasoning explains the characteristics which Gauḍapāda 
ascribes to ‘the nature of things’: ‘perfection’, for being is complete and needs 
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no further addition to make it complete; ‘original’ because being is cotermi-
nous with itself; and it is ‘uncreated’ because being is not the fruit of some-
thing else which also necessarily would have had to exist in order to produce 
being.15 And this nature never abandons its own being (sva-bhāva). Thus, all 
things partake of this nature and therefore are free from old age and death.16 
UTIlIzING NYāYA lOGIC AND EPISTEMOlOGY
Up till now Gauḍapāda has reasoned quite generally. But in 4.13 he uses termi-
nology derived from Nyāya logic in order to argue his case against causality:
ajād vai jāyate yasya dṛṣṭāntas tasya nāsti vai /
jātāc ca jāyāmānasya na vyavasthā prasajyate //13//
Whoever claims that [an effect] is born from an unborn [cause], cannot refer to 
a [valid generally] perceived fact [to support this claim]. And in the case of [an 
effect] that is born from [a cause] that is itself in the process of being born, we 
arrive at an infinite regress [of cause and effect].
(GK 4.13)
The first part of the reasoning maintains that effects which are by defini-
tion produced and finite cannot arise from a cause that is itself uncreated. 
Gauḍapāda refers to a Nyāya term: ‘generally perceived fact’ (dṛṣṭānta), which 
is used in syllogistic reasoning. Gauḍapāda thus holds that it is impossible 
to point to perceptible objects that are eternal and produce impermanent 
effects. The second part of Gauḍapāda’s reasoning amounts to stating that no 
effect can arise from a cause that is itself again the product of another thing 
acting as its cause, and so on. We would not know what is cause and what is 
effect if we have to go back eternally to last causes which again would actually 
be effects of deeper causes. The infinite regress is a logical flaw that is rejected 
in Nyāya (as in other Indian schools with an empirical epistemology and logic 
based on such an epistemology). 
The definition of ‘generally perceived fact’ in the NS shows its importance 
in logical reasoning. According to NS 1.1.25: laukikaparīkṣakāṇāṃ yasminn arthe 
buddhisāmyaṁ sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ, ‘A [generally] perceived fact is a thing of which 
ordinary people and [expert] investigators17 have the same cognition’. This 
15. Unfortunately, space does not permit to compare Gauḍapāda’s reasoning with that of Par-
menides, fragments 2, 6 and 7; and Melissos of Samos, fragment 1 (Diels 1964; Kirk, Raven 
and Schofield 1983: 244–48, 393).
16. These two sound very Buddhistic. They point to the qualities of impermanence and 
suffering.
17. I interpret this compound as a dvandva; this is the way the NB interprets it. this interpreta-
tion seems to make sense in that both ordinary persons and learned experts must have the 
same cognition of a given fact. One could also interpret the compound as a karmadharaya: 
‘worldly experts’, as distinct from mystics and divine beings. The latter would have cogni-
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means that in a syllogism one has to use as major premise a fact (anta) that is 
perceived or seen (dṛṣṭa) by everyone to be the case. These must be facts that 
can be generally verified with one’s own sense-organs. In the Nyāya syllogism 
a ‘generally perceived fact’ validates the reasoning that the syllogism is sup-
posed to accomplish. The epistemological presupposition is that one perceives 
real things with the help of the five senses and that such knowledge can be 
verified. Valid logical reasoning follows upon valid sensory cognition. NS 1.1.4, 
which defines both perception and means of valid cognition in general, makes 
this clear: indriyārthasannikarṣottpannaṁ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri 
vyavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣam, ‘Knowledge which arises from the proximity 
of the senses to an object, is perception [as a means of valid cognition. This 
knowledge should] not [yet] be expressible in language, not [be] erroneous, 
and [should] have the characteristic of ascertaining [the perceived object].’ Not 
all perceptions are means of valid cognition, but only those perceptions that 
are not based on preconceived notions (not yet expressible in language), that 
do not err, and that consist in ascertaining the perceived object. These cri-
teria are also valid for all the other means of valid cognition, of which infer-
ence is the next. NS 1.1.5 demands that inference as a means of valid cognition 
(pramāṇa) must be based on valid sensory perception.18 When inferences are 
communicated in language they follow the pattern of the syllogism. Thus, the 
Nyāya epistemological principle is that all verifiable knowledge ultimately 
derives from direct perception. The NS does not have a general theory of ontol-
ogy. Yet the reality of the outside world, the reality of the world as it appears to 
the senses, is the bedrock of Nyāya epistemology and thus of its implied realist 
ontology. Gauḍapāda accepts this seemingly realistic epistemology in GK 4.13. 
What exactly is the reasoning in the first line of GK 4.13? Gauḍapāda seems 
to imply the possibility that all things are created from causes. All things that 
have a beginning, have an end. This statement would function as a major 
premise in the reasoning. The next question or step could be: where do all 
these perishable things come from? From a cause. This cause could be either 
perishable itself, or not perishable. If perishable, then the cause is of the same 
nature as all things and thus no different from all things. This would already 
lead to infinite regress in the reasoning. The other option is that the cause 
is imperishable, unborn. But an unborn cause is imperceptible to the senses 
and therefore not admissible in the reasoning. Perceptible things are effects 
of perceptible causes. This is not only Gauḍapāda’s own proposition but also 
found in NS 4.1.11: vyaktād vyaktānāṁ pratyakṣaprāmāṇyāt, ‘Perceptible things 
tions that worldly experts do not have. Within the context of Nyāya debating technique 
the latter interpretation seems much less likely and therefore was not suggested by the NB. 
Angot (2009: 314) also interprets this term in NS 1.1.25 as a dvandva compound.
18. According to the NS the third and fourth means of valid cognition are ‘comparison’ 
(upamāna) and ‘[reliable] statement’ (śabda). Comparison is defined in NS 1.1.6, statement 
in NS 1.1.7-8. For a detailed treatment of ‘comparison’ as a separate means of valid cogni-
tion within the Nyāya philosophy over the centuries, see Chattopadhyay (2009).
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[emerge] from a perceptible [cause]; this is [established] by perception, [the 
prime] means of valid cognition’. The idea is that effects and causes need 
to be things perceptible to the senses. Their existence must be established 
with the help of the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), of which perception 
(pratyakṣa) is the first (see NS 1.1.4 quoted above).
The underlying reasoning about imperishability is again that everything that has 
a beginning, a birth, also has an end. What is unborn, has no end. According to 
Gauḍapāda such an unborn cause of all perishable things cannot be perceived by 
any means. It is very likely that Gauḍapāda is criticizing the NB on NS 4.1.11. the 
NB claims that perishable perceptible effects can emerge from imperishable per-
ceptible causes: rūpādiguṇayuktebhyaḥ pṛthivyādibhyo nityebhyo rūpādiguṇayuktaṃ 
śarīrādy utpadyate/ pratyakṣaprāmāṇyāt … dṛṣṭā hi rūpādiguṇayuktebhyo 
mṛtprabhṛtibhyas tathābhūtasya dravyasyotpattiḥ, dṛṣṭena cādṛṣṭasyānumānam iti/ ‘[A 
perceptible non-eternal thing] such as the body etc., which possesses [percep-
tible] properties like form etc, originates from eternal [perceptible things] like 
earth etc which [equally] possess [perceptible] properties like form etc. “this is 
[established] by perception, [the prime] means of valid cognition”. For it is per-
ceived [by the senses] that a [particular] object originating from clay etc. which 
possesses properties like form etc., is also like this [i.e. also possesses form etc.]. 
This amounts to inferring [the existence of] something not perceived on the basis 
of [something] that is perceived.’
(NB 224: 1–3)
In Gauḍapāda’s understanding of correct reasoning, the assertion that all 
perishable things may have an imperishable cause, cannot function as a major 
premise (the example, udāharaṇa, in the Nyāya syllogism, but Gauḍapāda uses 
the term dṛṣṭānta in accordance with post-NS usage). Note that the NB claims 
that we would be able to validly infer that imperishable perceptible causes 
like earth, can produce perceptible perishable effects like bodies. Gauḍapāda 
refutes this by saying that there is no generally perceived instance of an 
imperishable cause producing perishable objects. Gauḍapāda’s underlying 
hypothesis must be that all perceptible things are perishable. This would be 
in perfect line with general Buddhist doctrine.
SEED AND SPROUT
let us return to Gauḍapāda and his refutation of causality. In GK 4.20 he sums 
up his arguments against causality as follows:
bījāṅkurākhyo dṛṣṭāntaḥ sadā sādhyasamo hi saḥ /
na hi sādhyasamo hetuḥ siddhau sādhyasya yujyate //20//
A [generally] perceived fact designated as ‘seed and sprout’ [with which to prove 
that an effect arises from a cause] is always [a futile rejoinder of the type] ‘what 
is itself in need of proof ’. But a [fallacious] logical reason ‘that is itself in need of 
proof ’ will never work in establishing [a thesis] ‘that is to be proved’.
(GK 4.20)
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Gauḍapāda is formulating a hypothetical rejoinder to his statement that all 
things in their totality are unborn: all things have come about as effects from 
a cause, like a sprout has come about from a seed. It is clear that this rejoinder 
contains an infinite regress: for one could always ask ‘where did the original 
seed come from?’ The answer would be ‘from another plant that started as a 
sprout which was the effect of a preceding seed, and so on’ ad infinitum. 
What should attract our attention is that Gauḍapāda is using four/five 
technical terms of Nyāya logic and debating technique. First there is the ‘[gen-
erally] perceived fact’ (dṛṣṭānta) which he had used also in GK 4.13 referred to 
above. As a major premise in a Nyāya syllogism it is called udāharaṇa, ‘exam-
ple’. For convenience sake we could translate the term dṛṣṭānta also as ‘exam-
ple’, but we should keep in mind that the example in the syllogism contains 
the statement of a fact that everyone has perceived to be the case. The second 
term is the futile rejoinder (jāti) consisting in ‘what is itself in need of proof ’ 
(sādhyasama). Futile rejoinders are enumerated in NS 5.1.1. They are counter-
reasons used mistakenly in a philosophical debate. NS 5.1.4 names six sub-
classes of futile rejoinders among which sādhyasama, ‘what is itself in need 
of proof ’, is the sixth. This should not be confused with sādhyasama, ‘similar 
to what is to be proved’. The latter is a form of fallacious reason offered in a 
syllogism. NS 1.2.4 enumerates five fallacious reasons of which sādhyasama is 
the fourth type. The actual definition of sādhyasama as fallacious reason (and 
not as a type of futile rejoinder) is defined in NS 1.2.8.19 In the first hemistich, 
Gauḍapāda refers to futile reasoning and hence it is reasonable to assume he 
refers to the sādhyasama type of futile rejoinder. In the second hemistich, he 
refers to the syllogistic reasoning process itself, and thus the same term now 
probably means fallacious reason (hetvābhāsa). One could argue that fallacious 
reason and the sādhyasama type of futile rejoinder refer to the same thing in 
Gauḍapāda’s verse. The next specific term is ‘logical reason’ [used in the syl-
logism] (hetu), whose function in the syllogism is defined in NS 1.1.34-35. the 
last term is ‘what is to be proved’ [through the syllogism] (sādhya). This refers 
to the first step in the syllogism, and is defined in NS 1.1.33. considering that 
these terms occur in different parts of the NS (chapters 1 and 5), we must 
assume that Gauḍapāda was sufficiently acquainted with the epistemologi-
cal and logical doctrines of the NS and the NB, if not with the content of these 
texts themselves. After all, he seems to imply that his audience understands 
what he is referring to. The fact that Gauḍapāda uses Nyāya terms implies 
that he takes them seriously, or at least thinks his audience understands the 
impact of their use. He clearly expects his readers to grasp the references he 
is making to logic. Without knowing the reasoning techniques of the NS and 
NB, Gauḍapāda’s argument in this verse would remain quite unintelligible.
19. In his French edition and translation of the NS and NB, Angot (2009: 743) warns us to distin-
guish clearly between sādhyasama as a particular type of futile rejoinder and as a particular 
type of fallacious reason.
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The example / generally perceived fact of the seed and the sprout to which 
Gauḍapāda refers in GK 4.20 in connection with causality occurs in the NB on 
NS 4.1.14-18. The latter passage contains a discussion on causality that seems 
relevant and helpful for understanding what Gauḍapāda refutes in GK 4.20. 
let us look closer at this NS passage and the NB on it.
NS 4.1.14 formulates a proposition: abhāvād bhāvotpattir nānupamṛdya 
prādurbhāvāt, ‘An existent thing emerges out of non-being because [the exis-
tent thing] cannot come into being without destroying [the cause from which 
it is produced]’. On NS 4.1.14 the NB explains: 
asataḥ sad utpadyate ity ayaṃ pakṣaḥ/ kasmāt? upamṛdya prādurbhāvāt/ upamṛdya 
bījam aṅkura utpadyate nānupamṛdya, na ced bījopamardo ’ṅkurakāraṇam anupamarde 
’pi bījasyāṅkurotpattiḥ syād iti//
‘Out of a non-existent [cause] an existent [effect] emerges,’ this is the position. On 
what [ground]? On the ground that [something] becomes manifest after [some-
thing] has been destroyed. A sprout emerges after destroying the seed, not with-
out destroying it. If the destruction of the seed would not be the cause of the 
sprout, then the sprout might emerge even without the destruction of the seed.
(NB 225: 5-7)
the last sentence contains a reductio ad absurdum. The sprout only emerges 
when it destroys the seed, not without destroying it, otherwise one would 
see sprouts emerge out of the blue without the seed or without changes in 
the seed. One should note that this is not the final position in the discussion 
but an illustration of the initial objection to the argument that an effect (per-
ceptible to the senses) emerges from a cause which is also perceptible to the 
senses (NS 4.1.13).
The refutation of this in NS 4.1.15 runs: vyāghātād aprayogaḥ, ‘The appli-
cation [of this reasoning] is not [correct] because [the reasoning] is self-
defeating’. The obvious self-defeating element in the objection is that from 
nothing comes nothing. The cause needs to be something, not nothing. There-
fore, literally, the objection of NS 4.1.14 is self-defeating because it suggests 
that an exist thing comes out of non-existence and that as effect it can be the 
cause of destruction of the cause. Commenting on NS 4.1.15 the NB discusses 
the impossibility of the destruction of cause by the effect:
upamṛdya prādurbhāvād ity ayuktaḥ prayogo vyāghātāt/ yad upamṛdnāti na tad upamṛdya 
prādurbhavitum arhati20 vidyamānatvāt/ yac ca prādurbhavati na tenāprādurbhūtenāvidy
amānenopamarda iti//
The application [of this reasoning], namely that something becomes manifest 
after destroying [its cause], is illogical because it is self-defeating. That which 
destroys [i.e. the effect], may not become manifest after it has done its destruc-
tion [of the cause], because otherwise it would already have been present [before 
20. This is the majority reading. Thakur (1997) reads here: prādurbhavatīti, ‘becomes manifest’. 
This may be a misprint or a misreading by the editor.
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destroying its cause]. And that which becomes manifest [i.e. the effect] is not the 
destruction [of the cause] as something non-manifest and non-existent.
(NB 225: 11-13)
A cause that is not manifest is nothing; an effect that effects destruction would 
already exist before its appearance.
The opponent objects (NS 4.1.16): nātītānāgatayoḥ kārakaśabdaprayogāt, 
‘This is not [correct], for we do use words in sentences referring to a thing 
in the past or in the future’. One can speak about things existing in the past 
and not now, or about things that will exist in the future that do not exist 
now; such statements are not empty or false. In the commentary on NS 4.1.16, 
the NB returns to the seed and sprout once more: prādurbhaviṣyann aṅkura 
upamṛdnātīti bhāktaṃ kartṛtvam, ‘A sprout that is about to become manifest 
destroys the seed, but this agency [of the sprout is mentioned only] meta-
phorically’ (NB 226: 5-6). In other words, a sprout can metaphorically destroy 
the seed because it appears after the destruction of the seed.
This opposition is refuted in NS 4.1.17: na vinaṣṭebhyo ‘niṣpatteḥ, ‘This is not 
[a correct objection] because [things] do not emerge from [causes] that are 
destroyed’. On this sūtra the NB briefly comments: na vinaṣṭād bījād aṅkura 
utpadyata iti / tasmān nābhāvād bhāvotpattir iti, ‘A sprout does not emerge from 
a seed that is destroyed. Therefore an existent thing cannot emerge from a 
non-existent thing’ (NB 226: 9-10). This is the more universal argument that 
nothingness cannot be the origin of anything, and that if anything emerges, 
it must have emerged from something rather than nothing.
The final objection to NS 4.1.17 is NS 4.1.18: kramanirdeśād apratiṣedhaḥ, 
‘We do not deny this because we are only pointing to the temporal sequence 
[in which a thing emerges from its cause]’. The objection is that temporal 
sequence allows one to speak of causes and effects and causes that in time will 
be destroyed in order to make room for the emergent effect. The last occur-
rence of the seed and the sprout in NB is in the commentary on NS 4.1.18. 
bījāvayavāḥ kutaścin nimittāt prādurbhūtakriyāḥ pūrvavyūhaṁ jahati / vyūhāntaraṁ 
cāpadyante / vyūhāntarād aṅkura utpadyate21 / dṛśyante khalu avayavās tatsaṃyogāś 
cāṅkurotpattihetavaḥ / na cānivṛtte pūrvavyūhe bījāvayavānāṁ śakyaṁ 
vyūhāntareṇa bhavitum ity upamardaprādurbhāvayoḥ paurvāparyaniyamaḥ kramaḥ 
/ tasmān nābh āvād bhāvotpattir iti / na cānyad bījāvayavebhyo ’ṅkurotpattikāraṇam 
ity upapadyate bījopādānaniyama iti / /
Something causes the parts of a seed, parts whose activities have become mani-
fest, to abandon the earlier structure [of the seed], and those [parts] restructure 
themselves in another shape. From this other structure emerges the sprout. We 
can definitely notice that these parts and their [new] configurations cause the 
emergence of the sprout. And it is not possible that a new structure of the parts of 
the seed can exist without the disappearance of the earlier structure: thus there is 
21. This is the reading in most editions. Thakur (1997) reads aṅkurotpattiḥ. The meaning in both 
cases remains the same.
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the temporal sequence, the regularity of what was first and what followed in the 
case of the destruction [of the seed] and the manifestation [of the sprout]. There-
fore [our position] does not imply the emergence of an existent thing from a non-
existent thing. And there is no other cause for the emergence of the sprout than 
the parts of the seed; and thus it is correct to say that the seed is the material cause 
[of the emerging sprout].
(NB 226: 15–227: 4)
What exactly did Gauḍapāda do with this argument? The NB argument is part 
of the objection to the initial thesis of the proponent in NS 4.1.14 (existent 
things spring from non-being) and NS 4.1.15 (non-existent things as causes 
cannot produce effects). The seed and sprout example illustrates that there is 
a temporal sequence between cause and effect and that the cause—the seed—
has to disappear in order to give rise to the effect—the sprout. The obvious 
fallacy in this example is the infinite regress. What or where is the original 
cause of all sprouts? If we cannot arrive at an ultimate seed, then Gauḍapāda 
draws the conclusion that all things are unborn. Since NS 4.1.18 ends with 
the idea that effects emerge from causes in due time, it is plausible to assume 
that Gauḍapāda refutes the objection by saying that things have no origin and 
thus the seed and the sprout are mere figures of speech; or, worse, the exam-
ple constitutes an infinite regress. Thus as a major premise the example is 
itself in need of proof. This interpretation of Gauḍapāda’s intention is further 
strengthened by the NB discussion itself. The parts of the seed change into 
another configuration which results in the sprout. One could argue that the 
parts are eternal and unborn in order to perform this feat. This might be the 
conclusion Gauḍapāda could draw from the seed and sprout example. It looks 
like another instance in which Gauḍapāda criticizes the reasoning of the NB.
GlOWING CHIP OF WOOD
What is Gauḍapāda’s purpose in exposing the fallacy of reasoning about ulti-
mate causality? This question brings us back to Gauḍapāda’s intention to 
explain consciousness and the objects of consciousness. In the sequel to his 
rejection of causality, Gauḍapāda shifts his attention to consciousness and the 
seeming unreality of the objects of consciousness. The absence of causality is 
the reason for proposing the thesis that the objects of perception are nothing 
but the images in waking and dream consciousness. Reality for Gauḍapāda is 
that which is being perceived, and this is no different from consciousness as 
such. Consciousness does not really touch outward objects. On the basis of 
the argument against causality, Gauḍapāda argues that consciousness is not 
born: na jāyate cittaṁ cittadṛśyaṁ na jāyate, ‘consciousness is not born, nor is 
what is perceived by consciousness born’ (4.28ab). Here the thesis that noth-
ing is born is repeated. This means that being and all states of consciousness 
are unborn. Gauḍapāda reiterates this point several times:
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utpādasyāprasiddhatvād ajaṁ sarvam udāhṛtam /
na ca bhūtād abhūtasya saṃbhavo ’sti kathañcana / /38//
…
evaṁ na jāyate cittam evaṁ dharmā ajāḥ smṛtāḥ /46ab
Since the birth of everything [i.e. of all things] is impossible, it is established 
through logic that [everything] is unborn. Moreover, non-being can never arise 
from being.
…
Thus [perceiving] consciousness is not born; thus all things are regarded 
as unborn.
(GK 4.38, 46ab)
The phrase ‘established through logic’ (udāhṛtam) refers to the arguments 
put forward in 4.13. In the sequel to the thesis that consciousness and all 
things are unborn, Gauḍapāda stresses even more the unity of being with 
consciousness. In other words, consciousness is being and being is con-
sciousness: consciousness and its objects are one and the same. To clarify 
this position Gauḍapāda uses the example of the glowing chip of wood, an 
image whose origin we will discuss later. let us first look at Gauḍapāda’s 
statement:
ṛjuvakrādikābhāsam alātaspanditaṁ yathā /
grahaṇagrāhakābhāsaṁ vijñānaspanditaṁ tathā //47//
aspandamānam alātam anābhāsam ajaṃ yathā /
aspandamānaṁ vijñānam anābhāsam ajaṁ tathā //48//
A glowing chip of wood appears as a straight line or a curved [line] etc. when it 
is moved about rapidly. In like manner, consciousness appears as perception and 
perceiver when it moves about rapidly.
A glowing chip of wood that does not move about rapidly, does not appear [as 
anything] and it is unborn [i.e. the straight and curved lines are not born]. In like 
manner, consciousness that does not move about rapidly, does not appear [as per-
ception and perceiver] and is unborn.
(GK 4.47–48)
vijñāne spandamāne vai nābhāsā anyatobhuvaḥ /
na tato ’nyatra nispandān na vijñānaṁ viśanti te // 51//
na nirgatās te vijñānād dravyatvābhāvayogataḥ /
kāryakāraṇatābhāvād yato ‘cintyāḥ sadaiva te //52//
When consciousness moves rapidly, the appearances [of perception and perceiver 
and all things] do not spring from anything else [but consciousness]. They are 
[located] in nothing else but the rapid movement [of consciousness], and they do 
not enter consciousness.
They are not produced from consciousness because they do not have substanti-
ality. And because effect and cause do not exist, they are always beyond imagina-
tion [or thinking / or conceptualization].
(GK 4.51-52)
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dharmā ya iti jāyante jāyante te na tattvataḥ /
janma māyopamaṁ teṣāṁ sā ca māyā na vidyate //58 //
We imagine that all things are born [from causes], but in reality they are not born. 
Their birth can be compared to the show of magic, and also that show of magic 
does not exist [in reality].
(GK 4.58)
The simile is reasonably clear: whatever we perceive in whatever state of con-
sciousness (waking or dreaming) emerges from consciousness itself. This is 
like the various shapes we observe in the dark when a glowing chip of wood 
is moved quickly. We do not perceive the single glowing point, we see lines 
and circles. These lines and circles do not exist as separate objects, they are 
nothing but the movements of the glowing point. They give the impression 
of solidity whereas in reality they are nothing but the movement of a single 
point. In like manner, our consciousness moves about quickly and creates the 
images we think we perceive as objects outside of ourselves. In reality, this is 
all the rapid movement of consciousness, and hence the outside world is like 
a magic show—presumably, as the wheels and bars of light we see in the dark 
are just the single glowing point. 
The idea behind Gauḍapāda’s thesis is that we know nothing about the out-
side world but what we perceive of it in our own consciousness. We cannot 
know anything else because our knowledge of the world is the same as our own 
consciousness of the world. The outside world is what we perceive and hence 
the world is actually our own consciousness. It is very likely that Gauḍapāda 
borrowed this idea from Vijñānavāda Buddhism, or more precisely from Vasu-
bandhu’s Viṁśatikā 1ab: vijñaptimātram evaitad asadarthāvabhāsanāt, ‘All this 
[i.e. the totality of the world] is nothing but [our own] consciousness. This is 
so because [in our consciousness] objects appear that do not exist.’ Through-
out the Viṁśatikā Vasubandhu argues from this basic thesis that all we per-
ceive is nothing but our own perception or consciousness (vijñapti).22 As far as 
the illusionistic intents of this thesis are concerned, Gauḍapāda follows Vasu-
bandhu and elaborates on the thesis of mere consciousness (vijñaptimātratā) 
with his metaphor of the rapid movement of the glowing chip of wood (alāta), 
which, incidentally, provided the title to book 4: alātaśānti, ‘extinguishing the 
glowing chip of wood’. 
The image of the glowing chip of wood as a metaphor of the movement of 
consciousness and the way consciousness ‘creates’ an illusory reality, looks 
as if made for an illusionistic argument. The image itself appears to have 
had a long history of use before Gauḍapāda. In an extremely informative and 
22. To be precise, Gauḍapāda does not use this particular term, but he does use other terms 
denoting consciousness: citta, manas and vijñāna. Vasubandhu himself mentions these 
three terms as synomymous with vijñapti (Viṁśatikā, Sylvain lévi p. 3, l. 3). Interestingly, 
NS 1.1.15 has a similar statement: buddhir upalabdhir jñānam ity anarthāntaram, ‘Intelligence, 
cognition, knowledge: these are synonyms’. 
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rich article James Fitzgerald (2012) describes the many occurrences of the 
image of the glowing chip of wood in the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa, 
the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad, NS and NB, Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda.23 What is 
interesting is that Fitzgerald notices the specific use of the rapidly moving 
glowing chip of wood in an epistemological context in NS 3.2.56-58 (Fitzger-
ald 2012: 778). We will return to this NS passage below. In connection with 
Gauḍapāda, Fitzgerald remarks that in 4.47-52 the former makes use of ‘a very 
old … artifice and its inherent tension between unity and multiplicity that 
appears in the form of a world of objects with subjectivity viewing it’ (p. 798). 
Fitzgerald stresses that Gauḍapāda ‘hit upon a thoroughly apt representa-
tion of the tension between the … unity of … experience … and the realiza-
tion that that experience is fundamentally erroneous’ (p. 804). In the same 
paragraph Fitzgerald states that the ‘alātacakra artifice was so productive in 
epic literature and Buddhist polemics’ (p. 804). A Mahāyāna text that is con-
temporary with Gauḍapāda is the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (probably fourth or fifth 
century ce, Vaidya 1963: xv). It also cites the image of the alātacakra together 
with other metaphors like eye-disease, dream, fata morgana and the son of 
a barren woman—all imagery designating that which does not truly exist or 
that which is wrongly imagined: Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, ch. 1, v. 40 (Vaidya 1963: 4, 
l.25); ch. 1, prose (p. 38, ll. 26-28); ch. 2, v. 155 (p. 40, l. 14); ch. 10, v. 173 (p. 118, 
l. 31); ch. 10, v. 443 (p. 136, l. 20).
And yet, to understand the reason behind Gauḍapāda’s use of the simile in 
his explanation of the way consciousness illusorily creates the outside world, 
we should turn once more to the NS and NB. Fitzgerald does not see a con-
nection between the NS (to which he does refer) and Gauḍapāda (in fact Bouy 
(2000: 255) does briefly hint at a connection). In NS 3.2.56-59 there is an exam-
ination of the inner faculty of the mind (manas): the proponent offers a thesis, 
an opponent offers objections which are refuted by the proponent. The dis-
cussion in 3.2.56-59 has to investigate the existence and function of the mind 
whose definition in NS 1.1.16 runs: yugapajjñānānutpattir manaso liṅgam, ‘The 
mark [to infer the presence] of the mind is the fact that [instances of] cogni-
tion do not come about simultaneously’. The NS posits the mind as an inner 
mental organ that arranges, one after the other, the different impressions 
received by the senses; that is, the mind makes all the various instances of 
cognition into a coherent whole.
In 3.2.56-59 this definition / thesis is being discussed. First the propo-
nent (NS 3.2.56): jñānāyaugapadyād ekaṁ manaḥ, ‘The mind is a single [fac-
ulty] because [instances of] cognition are not [realized] simultaneously’. This 
Sūtra seems to merely repeat the thesis of NS 1.1.16. The opponent objects (NS 
3.2.57): na yugapad anekakriyopalabdheḥ, ‘There is not [mind as a single faculty 
but numerous minds] because we observe [that the same person performs] 
many [different] actions at the same time’. The objection looks a bit like a 
23. I owe the reference to Fitzgerald’s article to Dr Simon Brodbeck, Cardiff University.
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futile rejoinder. The refutation is given in NS 3.2.58, a refutation that con-
tains our image of the glowing chip of wood: alātacakradarśanavat tadupalab-
dhir āśusañcārāt, ‘Observing the [performance of many different actions at the 
same time by a single person does not imply that this person has many dif-
ferent minds]: due to rapid movement a single glowing chip of wood is seen 
to produce circles [and the like], similarly [due to rapid movement the single 
mind performs many tasks so that it only seems there are many minds work-
ing simultaneously]’. Here we have the image, and in much the same way as 
Gauḍapāda uses it in his book 4. The rapid movement of the chip of wood cre-
ates the illusion of circles, and so on. Similarly, the rapid movement of the 
single mind gives the illusion of many minds doing things at the same time. 
The image is supposed to explain why the single mind can focus on many 
tasks simultaneously. This is an illusion. In fact, the mind moves so rapidly 
that one does not notice that the mind is performing its tasks one after the 
other in rapid succession. The final refutation of the multiple mind, and a 
further illustration of the rapid movement, is NS 3.2.59: yathoktahetutvāc cāṇu, 
‘And on these grounds [we argue] that [the single mind] is [rapidly moving 
and infinitesimally small like] an atom’. The size of an atom reflects the idea 
of a small glowing chip of wood in the dark. 
Now we can turn to the NB on NS 3.2.58. What does it add to what we have 
already found in the NS?
āśusañcārād alātasya bhramato vidyamānaḥ kramo na gṛhyate / kramasyāgrahaṇād 
avicchedabuddhyā cakravad buddhir bhavati / tathā buddhīnāṁ kriyāṇāṁ cāśuvṛttitvād 
vidyamānaḥ kramo na gṛhyate / kramasyāgrahaṇād yugapat kriyā bhavantīty abhimāno 
bhavati/24
When the glowing chip of wood is whirling due to rapid movement, we do not 
perceive this process [step by step] even though it is going on; and we have the 
cognition of it as a circle because our cognition is not divided [into separate single 
moments] due to the fact that we do not perceive the process [in its single steps]. 
In the same way we do not perceive the process that is going on [step by step] due 
to the rapid activity of moments of cognition and [all kinds of] actions [it per-
forms]. Because we do not perceive the process, we imagine that [all these sepa-
rate] actions [of cognition] are happening at the same time.
(NB 208: 7-10)
the NB makes more explicit what NS 3.2.58 leaves unsaid. The rapidity of 
the movement of the mind suggests to our internal perception and our per-
ception of others that the mind does many things at the same time. But 
in reality,there are only the rapid moments of actions and cognitions that 
follow upon each other. Their movements suggest solidity and unity, where-
as in reality there is momentariness and rapid movement of one single atom-
sized mind working within ourselves. Gauḍapāda seems to have regarded 
this image and its application to the rapid working of the mind to be useful 
24. All text-editions read bhavati. Only Thakur (1997) reads bhavatīti.
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to apply to his doctrine of outward reality as rapidly moving consciousness. 
What is striking is that the NS and NB also use this metaphor of the whirl-
ing glowing chip of wood in the context of consciousness. The Nyāya uses 
the simile to explain how a single infinitesimally small mind can perform 
many actions of coordination rapidly so as to create the illusion of unity. 
This is precisely what Gauḍapāda seems to intend in his use of the simile. 
Consciousness is in fact non-dual and unborn, but through rapid movement 
it creates the outside world. The difference between Nyāya and Gauḍapāda 
is, of course, that the former regards mind as a separate internal organ the 
size of an atom, whereas Gauḍapāda and his Buddhist precursor Vasubandhu 
do not divide consciousness into mind, intelligence and self (manas, buddhi 
and ātman), as the Nyāya does.25 The image of the glowing chip of wood was 
not invented by the Nyāya; it was already available. But it is the particular 
application of this image to consciousness or mind that suggests Gauḍapāda 
was influenced or inspired by the NS and NB. One could perhaps even read 
Gauḍapāda’s use of the image as a veiled critique of the NS. the latter tries 
to explain why an atom-sized mind can be present all over the body to coor-
dinate sense-impressions into a coherent whole. But Gauḍapāda rejects the 
outer sense-impressions and draws the conclusion that we only perceive the 
world in our consciousness, and hence the outer world must be the prod-
uct of our consciousness. How does consciousness accomplish this? By rapid 
movement—just as the unitary impression of the senses is coordinated by a 
rapidly moving mind, according to the Nyāya.
coNclUSIoNS
What conclusions can we draw from Gauḍapāda’s use of early Nyāya episte-
mology and logic in reasoning against the reality of the world? Perhaps the 
first conclusion has a bearing on reality and what constitutes reality. As we 
have seen in 4.1-2 and 4.100, for Gauḍapāda ultimate reality is consciousness 
without an object, or the only object of consciousness is itself. There is only 
unborn and endless consciousness whose object is the same consciousness. 
Subject and object are indivisible and undivided.26 Whatever consciousness 
perceives as outer objects are in reality its own products, and these outer 
objects appear to the perceiver as a magic show (māyā). one could argue 
that Gauḍapāda does not deny the reality of this objectless consciousness. 
The realization of such consciousness as objectless, he designates as a joyful 
‘state of no-touch’ (4.2, 3.39). The fact that the appearance of objects does 
25. NS defines self (ātman) in 1.1.10, intelligence (buddhi) in 1.1.15 and mind (manas) in 1.1.16.
26. Hence Gauḍapāda’s frequent reference to the term ‘non-duality’, advaya / advaita, in all 
four texts. This term Gauḍapāda uses to designate this state of consciousness: cf. GK 4.45, 
4.62, 4.75, 4.77, 4.80, 4.85, 2.33, 2.35-36, 3.18, 3.30, 1.10, 1.16, 1.29. 
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take place, means that something is perceived. The unreality of the differ-
ent objects of perception is based on the fact that they are produced by the 
rapid movement of consciousness. Consciousness produces the seeming outer 
objects, as in the dark a glowing chip of wood creates rings and bars (being 
in reality nothing but the rapid whirling of the single glowing chip of wood). 
One could interpret this metaphor as follows: the origin of the appearance of 
the outer world is real; the actual appearance of objects is like a magic show, 
and thus the seeming objects lack substantiality and permanence. Real cau-
sality in the outside world is what Gauḍapāda is trying to attack. All things are 
nothing but the magic product of consciousness itself.
It would seem absurd to claim that every individual consciousness is cre-
ating his or her own world. The causality that many persons can observe, or 
the objects that many persons observe in a similar way, all this goes against 
idealistic solipsism. It flies in the face of everyday experience to claim that we 
all create the things we see in our own consciousness. It is true that we see the 
world only in so far as we are able to perceive at all, so that it seems reason-
able to claim that the world is what we perceive and that the world rests as 
it were in our own consciousness. But why do many people observe the same 
object and can also describe that object as if it really existed outside of their 
own consciousness? This would be the realistic rebuttal of Gauḍapāda-like 
idealistic illusionism. In fact, this would amount to the basic philosophical 
position of the Nyāya. Gauḍapāda’s answer is simple: all individual manifes-
tations of consciousness are also just the rapid movement of objectless con-
sciousness. In reality, there is only consciousness as unlimited as space (4.1, 
and later 3.3-9) and also its object is unlimited as space because it is the same 
consciousness. This unlimited consciousness projects causality and differ-
ences between persons and things onto itself like a magic show. Since every 
individual consciousness is itself part of this magic show, all could perceive 
the same magic show. And hence the outer objects seem to really exist for 
those that perceive them.
If this presentation of Gauḍapāda’s intention is accepted, the next step, 
Gauḍapāda utilizing Nyāya logic and epistemology, does not seem so outra-
geously out of place. Gauḍapāda shows he can legitimately use the realistic 
Nyāya system in a philosophical context that is the very opposite. After all, 
logical operations take place in the mind, that is, in one’s consciousness. The 
results of such operations may be relied upon since everyone can follow such 
operations and judge their correctness or incorrectness. The logical reasoning 
that Gauḍapāda unfolds in book 4 thus forms an integral part of the spiritual 
exercises necessary to realize the awakening pointed to in GK 4.100. In book 4 
Gauḍapāda is not very explicit about this objectless ultimate consciousness, 
but it seems implied that this consciousness is one, even if it is unlimited 
like space. Space, being unlimited, is also one and the same universal space. 
This single unlimited space-like consciousness produces through rapid move-
ment not only individual instances of consciousness (the numerous conscious 
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individuals), but also the objects seen by all in the waking state, and the inner 
quasi-illusory objects every individual consciousness observes in the dream 
state (GK 4.33-37; 4.61-70; 2.1-5; 2.9-10; 3.29-30; 1.15). Thus, the single original 
consciousness produces the world that every individual consciousness expe-
riences as real, and every consciousness is under the spell of the magic show 
to think it is witnessing the same world. Using logical reasoning by itself does 
not militate against the unreality of the world; in fact, it can reveal the illu-
sory character of the world. This is because logical reasoning is part of the 
same magic show as everything else is, and hence is also seemingly effec-
tive. Such seems to be the motivation behind Gauḍapāda’s use of realistic 
Nyāya logic in an argument whose burden is the ultimate unreality of the 
outer world. Reasoning can reveal something, in the same way as perception 
reveals something. The something may not be the ultimate truth, but it is 
useful and effective to show the relative unreality of the outer world. And 
the NS provided a valuable tool with its metaphor of the rapid movement of 
a burning chip of wood to explain how an atom-sized mind can seem to per-
form many tasks at the same time.
Is the above assessment of Gauḍapāda’s use of the Nyāya philosophy cor-
rect? As noted earlier, only book 4 uses explicit and sustained logical rea-
soning to disprove causality and the reality of the world. The other three 
texts do not do so. Moreover, only book 4 contains numerous explicit refer-
ences to Buddhist authors like Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu; the other three 
texts do not. Books 2, 3 and 1 unfold their doctrine almost exclusively on 
the basis of the Upaniṣads (which book 4 does not). Book 2 seems to pick 
up where book 4 left off. In book 2 the universal consciousness is now des-
ignated as ātman, ‘Self ’, a term that would be anathema in a positive sense 
in Buddhism. Book 2 mentions the Vedānta by name (GK 2.12). The supreme 
Self of the Upaniṣads Gauḍapāda also calls God, deva (2.12-16). this God / 
Self creates the world as a magic show that it projects onto its own con-
sciousness. Thus, things are created and perceived by individual conscious-
ness (also magically created by God) even though they are nothing but the 
single consciousness of the Self. In this way, Gauḍapāda makes his argument 
about the illusory creation of the world as taught in book 4 more explicit. It 
is the single supreme consciousness that projects reality onto its own con-
sciousness and thus magically creates the illusory world with its animate 
and inanimate things. In 3.29-30 Gauḍapāda briefly repeats his arguments 
of 4.61-62 and 4.47-52 to the effect that consciousness vibrates by its own 
magical power and thus creates the seeming dualities experienced as the 
waking state and the dream state.
This bring us back once more to the issue of the probable order in which 
the four texts were written. The scenario of the order of the four texts would 
then be somewhat as follows: Gauḍapāda started writing his thesis in Bud-
dhist terms, trying to amalgamate Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu while focusing 
on this main theme of non-dual consciousness. In the process he makes use 
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of (Brahmanical) Nyāya epistemology and logic and perhaps had the model 
of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad already vaguely in mind. His first work failed to 
convince Mahayanists, probably because they found his arguments too much 
smacking of Upaniṣad doctrines. Then Gauḍapāda decided to rewrite his main 
thesis exclusively in terms of Upaniṣads (Vetter 1978: 106-107). He wrote three 
more texts of which book 1 must be the last, for it is explicitly a treatment of 
the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and presupposes knowledge of the preceding three 
texts, including book 4. 
What about books 2 and 3? What is their order? Vetter suggested the order: 
4, 3, 2, 1. I think it is more likely to have been: 4, 2, 3, 1. In my sequence, book 2 
(a rather short essay) redefines the universal consciousness of book 4 in terms 
of the Upaniṣadic Self. But book 2 does not present the logical arguments we 
find in book 4—probably because book 2 is an appendix to book 4 which latter 
text it presupposes. There are references to book 4 in book 2, right from the 
beginning of book 2. Then book 3 follows on book 2. Book 3 is longer than 
book 2 and presents new metaphors. The most famous one is the metaphor of 
universal space to symbolize the universal Self of the Upaniṣads (GK 3.3-12). 
This well worked-out metaphor reads like an elaboration of book 4.1 in which 
consciousness is simply compared to space. Book 3 also points to meditational 
practices to control the mind. Only in book 1 do we find another hint at medi-
tational practice: GK 1.24-26 speaks about concentration on the sound ‘Om’. 
Neither book 4 nor book 2 shows any specific references to meditational prac-
tices. The more one studies the texts in my proposed order, the more they 
reveal the main themes of Gauḍapāda, the unity behind his thought, and the 
way the later texts hark back to the earlier texts. It is interesting that Rich-
ard King suggests the same order as mine, provided one accepts that book 4 
is early and preceded the other three (King 1999: 32). But King also suggests 
that book 4 may have been written much later and should be treated as a com-
pletely separate treatise (pp. 46-47, 235).
In sum, one could probably say that the exclusive Buddhist character of 
book 4 should not be overstressed. After all, we have seen references to Brah-
manical sources in the text as well. In fact, book 4 shows Gauḍapāda’s rela-
tive independence from iron-clad school affiliations or ‘religious’ affiliations. 
There is, of course, a shift from Buddhist terminology and references in book 
4 to Upaniṣadic terminology and references in the other three texts. But as 
far as use of sources is concerned, Gauḍapāda’s work seems composite and 
eclectic right from the start. Moreover, he is quite independent in his think-
ing. His goal, however, is not composite or eclectic. His goal remains the same 
in all four texts: how to realize a state of non-dual consciousness that tran-
scends description and conceptualization. He is building his case with hetero-
geneous sets of tools. Among them is the use of realism borrowed from the 
Nyāya system.
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